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	<title>Comments on: Ireland ratifies the Lisbon TreatyOld Europe is history</title>
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	<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/</link>
	<description>Life during wartime</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 22 May 2012 08:18:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-71276</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Nov 2011 00:09:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-71276</guid>
		<description>VERY GOOD on same theme as prior comment:

http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/what-really-caused-eurozone-crisis-part.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>VERY GOOD on same theme as prior comment:</p>
<p><a href="http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/what-really-caused-eurozone-crisis-part.html" rel="nofollow">http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/what-really-caused-eurozone-crisis-part.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-71275</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Nov 2011 00:08:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-71275</guid>
		<description>What chaos, what danger ...

Greece, Italy, Spain ...  France next.

The implementation of the Euro took down within the zone barriers to investment in the &quot;peripheral&quot; states. 

Investors from the richer north (former holders of the much stronger currencies) went on a Carpetbagging jaunt that last years. 

This combined with low interest rates created Booms in the peripheral lands, which in turn provoked the established, in-balance economies of the peripheral to &quot;Grow&quot; (borrow, build, borrow more, build more) to accommodate the sudden inflow of wealth/investment and encourage more of same.

But the whole thing was managed such as to not recoup from the incoming wealth a balanced return to the states incurring the new Boom-born debt.

This is how the Euro crisis was born. The southern socioeconomic polities had been largely in sync with themselves and suffering no wild debt problems. The various socioeconomic differences had always been accommodated at the border, with currency fluctuations. 

IE carpetbagging and a suddenly new hyperfertile environment for investment created an Investment-and-Debt circle that seemed Virtuous until credit suddenly dried up a few years ago.

Yet the corporate press has successfully painted the story with &quot;WE TOLD YOU SO!&quot; headlines over smug pieces about the fatal excesses of &quot;socialism.&quot;

And now the parliamentary governments of the &quot;peripheral&quot; states are being torn down overnight and replaced with Tyrants from the Banking Sector and (this weekend in Spain) neo-fascists of a Franconian sort -- pretty much at the behest of Berlin, which insists that a second Weimar must be avoided at all costs.

The French Big Banks will go under with the Spanish. The German banks will be there to pick up the pieces at pennies on the dollar (as JPMorgan got Bear and BoA Merrill ). 1870. 1918. 1945. 2012.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What chaos, what danger &#8230;</p>
<p>Greece, Italy, Spain &#8230;  France next.</p>
<p>The implementation of the Euro took down within the zone barriers to investment in the &#8220;peripheral&#8221; states. </p>
<p>Investors from the richer north (former holders of the much stronger currencies) went on a Carpetbagging jaunt that last years. </p>
<p>This combined with low interest rates created Booms in the peripheral lands, which in turn provoked the established, in-balance economies of the peripheral to &#8220;Grow&#8221; (borrow, build, borrow more, build more) to accommodate the sudden inflow of wealth/investment and encourage more of same.</p>
<p>But the whole thing was managed such as to not recoup from the incoming wealth a balanced return to the states incurring the new Boom-born debt.</p>
<p>This is how the Euro crisis was born. The southern socioeconomic polities had been largely in sync with themselves and suffering no wild debt problems. The various socioeconomic differences had always been accommodated at the border, with currency fluctuations. </p>
<p>IE carpetbagging and a suddenly new hyperfertile environment for investment created an Investment-and-Debt circle that seemed Virtuous until credit suddenly dried up a few years ago.</p>
<p>Yet the corporate press has successfully painted the story with &#8220;WE TOLD YOU SO!&#8221; headlines over smug pieces about the fatal excesses of &#8220;socialism.&#8221;</p>
<p>And now the parliamentary governments of the &#8220;peripheral&#8221; states are being torn down overnight and replaced with Tyrants from the Banking Sector and (this weekend in Spain) neo-fascists of a Franconian sort &#8212; pretty much at the behest of Berlin, which insists that a second Weimar must be avoided at all costs.</p>
<p>The French Big Banks will go under with the Spanish. The German banks will be there to pick up the pieces at pennies on the dollar (as JPMorgan got Bear and BoA Merrill ). 1870. 1918. 1945. 2012.</p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-51942</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 May 2011 16:46:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-51942</guid>
		<description>Der Spiegel suggests Greece is on the verge of withdraw from the Euro

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,761201,00.html

too much to hope for?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Der Spiegel suggests Greece is on the verge of withdraw from the Euro</p>
<p><a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,761201,00.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,761201,00.html</a></p>
<p>too much to hope for?</p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-51242</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 24 Apr 2011 03:42:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-51242</guid>
		<description>Papendrou anger re euro policies

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/papandreou-slams-ratings-agencies

It seems that a restructuring -- ie writedown, or increased maturities -- of greed sov debt is in the cards and imminent.

ie the german banks have agreed to cry uncle.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Papendrou anger re euro policies</p>
<p><a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/papandreou-slams-ratings-agencies" rel="nofollow">http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/papandreou-slams-ratings-agencies</a></p>
<p>It seems that a restructuring &#8212; ie writedown, or increased maturities &#8212; of greed sov debt is in the cards and imminent.</p>
<p>ie the german banks have agreed to cry uncle.</p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-51241</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 24 Apr 2011 03:40:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-51241</guid>
		<description>Greek anger re privatization of national assets to conform to bailout rigor:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/greece-privatisation-plans-raise-protests-debt-crisis

Civil war in greece, here and now, over Bailout bullshit:
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/meet-keratea-greeces-war-zone</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Greek anger re privatization of national assets to conform to bailout rigor:<br />
<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/greece-privatisation-plans-raise-protests-debt-crisis" rel="nofollow">http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/greece-privatisation-plans-raise-protests-debt-crisis</a></p>
<p>Civil war in greece, here and now, over Bailout bullshit:<br />
<a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/article/meet-keratea-greeces-war-zone" rel="nofollow">http://www.zerohedge.com/article/meet-keratea-greeces-war-zone</a></p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-49882</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2011 22:52:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-49882</guid>
		<description>Update on bad situation with Irish banks.  About $99 billion needed for four to meet Stress Test.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/business/global/01banks.html

Movement to reject Austerity and write down the Irish bank bonds strengthened by news.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Update on bad situation with Irish banks.  About $99 billion needed for four to meet Stress Test.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/business/global/01banks.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/business/global/01banks.html</a></p>
<p>Movement to reject Austerity and write down the Irish bank bonds strengthened by news.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-49481</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2011 13:53:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-49481</guid>
		<description>Here is the Soros piece from yesterday in the FT in its entirety:

How Germany can avoid a two-speed Europe

By George Soros

March 21 2011 

The “euro crisis” is generally seen as a currency crisis, but it is also a sovereign debt and, even more, a banking crisis. The situation is complex. The complexity has bred confusion, and this has political consequences. Europe’s various member states have formed widely different views and their policies reflect their views rather than their true national interests. The clash of perceptions carries the seeds of serious political conflicts.

The solution that is about to be put in place will, in effect, be dictated by Germany, without whose sovereign credit no solution is possible. France tries to influence the outcome but in the end must yield to Germany because its triple A rating is dependent on being closely allied with Germany.

Germany blames the crisis on the countries that have lost competitiveness and run up their debts, and so puts all the burden of adjustment on debtor countries. This is a biased view, which ignores the fact that this is not only a sovereign debt crisis but also a currency and banking crisis – and Germany bears a major share of responsibility for those crises.

When the euro was introduced it was expected to create convergence but it brought divergence instead. The European Central Bank treated the sovereign debt of all member countries as riskless and accepted them at its discount window on equal terms. Banks that were obliged to hold riskless assets to meet their liquidity requirements were induced to load up on the sovereign debt of the weaker countries to earn a few extra basis points. 

This lowered interest rates in Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy and Spain and generated housing bubbles – at the same time as Germany had to tighten its belt to cope with the costs of reunification. 

The result was a divergence in competitiveness, and a banking crisis that affected German banks more strongly than most of the others. Truth be told, Germany has been bailing out the heavily indebted countries as a way of protecting its own banking system.

The arrangements imposed by Germany protect the banking system by treating outstanding sovereign debt as sacrosanct; they also put all the burden of adjustment on the debtor countries. 

The arrangements are reminiscent of the international banking crisis of 1982, when the international financial institutions lent the debtor countries enough money to service their debts until the banks could build up sufficient reserves to exchange their bad debts for Brady bonds in 1989. That caused a “lost decade” for Latin America. Indeed, the current arrangements penalise the debtor countries even more than in the 1980s because they will have to pay hefty risk premiums after 2013.

There is something inconsistent in bailing out the banking system once again and then bailing in the holders of sovereign debt after 2013 by introducing collective action clauses. As a result, the European Union will suffer something worse than a lost decade; it will endure a chronic divergence in which the surplus countries forge ahead and the deficit countries are dragged down by the burden of accumulated debt. The competitiveness requirements will be imposed on an uneven playing field, putting deficit countries into an untenable position. Even Spain, which entered the euro crisis with a lower debt ratio than Germany, could be dragged down.

Berlin is imposing these arrangements under pressure from German public opinion, but the German public has not been told the truth and so is confused. The solution to the euro crisis to be put in place this week will set in stone a two-speed Europe. This will generate resentments that will endanger the EU’s political cohesion.

Two fundamental modifications are required. First, the European financial stability facility must rescue the banking system as well as member states. This will allow the restructuring of sovereign debt without precipitating a banking crisis. The size of the rescue package could stay the same because any amount used for recapitalising or liquidating banks would reduce the amount lent to sovereign states. Bringing the banks under European supervision rather than leaving them in the hands of national authorities would help restore confidence in the banking system.

Second, to create an even playing field, the risk premium on the borrowing costs of countries that abide by the rules will have to be removed. That could be accomplished by converting most sovereign debt into eurobonds; countries would then have to issue their own bonds with collective action clauses and pay the risk premium only on the amounts exceeding the Maastricht criteria. The first step could and should be taken immediately at Thursday’s summit; the second will have to wait. The German public is a long way from accepting it; yet it is needed to re-establish a level playing field. This has to be made clear to give deficit countries hope they can escape from their deficit predicament if they work hard enough at it.

The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and founder of the Open Society Foundations</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is the Soros piece from yesterday in the FT in its entirety:</p>
<p>How Germany can avoid a two-speed Europe</p>
<p>By George Soros</p>
<p>March 21 2011 </p>
<p>The “euro crisis” is generally seen as a currency crisis, but it is also a sovereign debt and, even more, a banking crisis. The situation is complex. The complexity has bred confusion, and this has political consequences. Europe’s various member states have formed widely different views and their policies reflect their views rather than their true national interests. The clash of perceptions carries the seeds of serious political conflicts.</p>
<p>The solution that is about to be put in place will, in effect, be dictated by Germany, without whose sovereign credit no solution is possible. France tries to influence the outcome but in the end must yield to Germany because its triple A rating is dependent on being closely allied with Germany.</p>
<p>Germany blames the crisis on the countries that have lost competitiveness and run up their debts, and so puts all the burden of adjustment on debtor countries. This is a biased view, which ignores the fact that this is not only a sovereign debt crisis but also a currency and banking crisis – and Germany bears a major share of responsibility for those crises.</p>
<p>When the euro was introduced it was expected to create convergence but it brought divergence instead. The European Central Bank treated the sovereign debt of all member countries as riskless and accepted them at its discount window on equal terms. Banks that were obliged to hold riskless assets to meet their liquidity requirements were induced to load up on the sovereign debt of the weaker countries to earn a few extra basis points. </p>
<p>This lowered interest rates in Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy and Spain and generated housing bubbles – at the same time as Germany had to tighten its belt to cope with the costs of reunification. </p>
<p>The result was a divergence in competitiveness, and a banking crisis that affected German banks more strongly than most of the others. Truth be told, Germany has been bailing out the heavily indebted countries as a way of protecting its own banking system.</p>
<p>The arrangements imposed by Germany protect the banking system by treating outstanding sovereign debt as sacrosanct; they also put all the burden of adjustment on the debtor countries. </p>
<p>The arrangements are reminiscent of the international banking crisis of 1982, when the international financial institutions lent the debtor countries enough money to service their debts until the banks could build up sufficient reserves to exchange their bad debts for Brady bonds in 1989. That caused a “lost decade” for Latin America. Indeed, the current arrangements penalise the debtor countries even more than in the 1980s because they will have to pay hefty risk premiums after 2013.</p>
<p>There is something inconsistent in bailing out the banking system once again and then bailing in the holders of sovereign debt after 2013 by introducing collective action clauses. As a result, the European Union will suffer something worse than a lost decade; it will endure a chronic divergence in which the surplus countries forge ahead and the deficit countries are dragged down by the burden of accumulated debt. The competitiveness requirements will be imposed on an uneven playing field, putting deficit countries into an untenable position. Even Spain, which entered the euro crisis with a lower debt ratio than Germany, could be dragged down.</p>
<p>Berlin is imposing these arrangements under pressure from German public opinion, but the German public has not been told the truth and so is confused. The solution to the euro crisis to be put in place this week will set in stone a two-speed Europe. This will generate resentments that will endanger the EU’s political cohesion.</p>
<p>Two fundamental modifications are required. First, the European financial stability facility must rescue the banking system as well as member states. This will allow the restructuring of sovereign debt without precipitating a banking crisis. The size of the rescue package could stay the same because any amount used for recapitalising or liquidating banks would reduce the amount lent to sovereign states. Bringing the banks under European supervision rather than leaving them in the hands of national authorities would help restore confidence in the banking system.</p>
<p>Second, to create an even playing field, the risk premium on the borrowing costs of countries that abide by the rules will have to be removed. That could be accomplished by converting most sovereign debt into eurobonds; countries would then have to issue their own bonds with collective action clauses and pay the risk premium only on the amounts exceeding the Maastricht criteria. The first step could and should be taken immediately at Thursday’s summit; the second will have to wait. The German public is a long way from accepting it; yet it is needed to re-establish a level playing field. This has to be made clear to give deficit countries hope they can escape from their deficit predicament if they work hard enough at it.</p>
<p>The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and founder of the Open Society Foundations</p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-49476</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2011 13:11:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-49476</guid>
		<description>George Soros in the Financial Times yesterday re the fundamental problems with the financial stability program about to be activated under German leadership:

Germany blames the crisis on the countries that have lost competitiveness and run up their debts, and so puts all the burden of adjustment on debtor countries. This is a biased view, which ignores the fact that this is not only a sovereign debt crisis but also a currency and banking crisis – and Germany bears a major share of responsibility for those crises.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d57505a-53f2-11e0-8bd7-00144feab49a.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>George Soros in the Financial Times yesterday re the fundamental problems with the financial stability program about to be activated under German leadership:</p>
<p>Germany blames the crisis on the countries that have lost competitiveness and run up their debts, and so puts all the burden of adjustment on debtor countries. This is a biased view, which ignores the fact that this is not only a sovereign debt crisis but also a currency and banking crisis – and Germany bears a major share of responsibility for those crises.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d57505a-53f2-11e0-8bd7-00144feab49a.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d57505a-53f2-11e0-8bd7-00144feab49a.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-44269</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2011 18:37:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-44269</guid>
		<description>Another Times Mag feature -- Merkel and Sarkozy, the Odd Couple

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16MerkelSarkozy-t.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another Times Mag feature &#8212; Merkel and Sarkozy, the Odd Couple</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16MerkelSarkozy-t.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16MerkelSarkozy-t.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: ed</title>
		<link>http://newcombat.net/Conversation/2009/10/04/ireland-ratifies-lisbon-treaty/comment-page-1/#comment-44267</link>
		<dc:creator>ed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2011 18:37:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newcombat.net/Conversation/?p=2070#comment-44267</guid>
		<description>A snapshot of Spain&#039;s finances

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/business/global/14euro.html?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A snapshot of Spain&#8217;s finances</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/business/global/14euro.html?" rel="nofollow">http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/business/global/14euro.html?</a></p>
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